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Comment On: Making the Case
for a Constitutional Right to
Minimum Entitlements
by Peter J. Ferrara*

Professor Chemerinsky advocates a sweeping, truly revolutionary
change in constitutional law to provide for a constitutional right to minimum government assistance from welfare/entitlement programs. He is to
be commended for his uncompromising boldness and unyielding faithfulness to his convictions. Unfortunately, his Article otherwise consists of
bad law, bad economics, bad social policy, and erroneous factual
assertions.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL METHODOLOGY

The basic constitutional methodology underlying Professor Chemerinsky's Article is fundamentally unsound, in my view, as a matter of both
legal and moral analysis. Clearly, the Constitution states nowhere that
individuals are to have a right to minimum government welfare assistance, and no provision of the Constitution was intended to provide for
such a right. Indeed, Professor Chemerinsky does not argue to the contrary. Instead, he rather flagrantly admits that he is advocating a nontextual right not based on the intent of the Framers or long-standing
traditions.'
. In Professor Chemerinsky's constitutional methodology, what the Constitution says or was intended to mean is not particularly important. New
"constitutional" rights may be developed over time through a process
* Associate Deputy Attorney General, Justice Department (1992-1993); Associate Profes-

sor of Law, George Mason School of Law (1987-1991); Senior Staff, Office of Policy and
Development in Reagan Administration (1982-1983). Harvard University (B.A., 1976 magna
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1. Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REy. 525 (1993)., ,
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that begins with a few intellectuals publishing articles arguing for what
they see as a morally compelling case for the adoption of such rights.
Through such articles and peer pressure in the academic/legal community, a few judges and ultimately five Supreme Court justices are convinced to use their judicial power to enforce such new rights as constitutionally based.
Transparently, this is not government by a democracy of free men and
women. It is government by a small academic/legal oligarchy. True, as
Professor Chemerinsky states, there are many in the academic community who passionately argue for the same methodology.2 But I believe this
entire, voluminous debate can be cut through by asking a simple question: When do the people get to vote on whether to adopt Professor
Chemerinsky's proposed constitutional right to minimum welfare entitlements? If no provision of the Constitution was originally intended to provide for such a right, then the people never voted to adopt such a right
when they adopted any provision of the Constitution. Professor Chemerinsky advocates that the Supreme Court simply declare his proposed
right to be constitutional now without a vote of the people on the question. As a matter of law and democratic moral principle, if Professor
Chemerinsky thinks a right to minimum welfare entitlements should be
added to the Constitution, then he should propose a formal constitutional
amendment and have the people vote on it.
But, indeed, Professor Chemerinsky argues that his proposed right to
minimum welfare entitlements should be judicially adopted precisely because the people would not democratically vote for the minimum entitlements he thinks should be required.3 Professor Chemerinsky has consequently made clear that his constitutional methodology is not merely
undemocratic, it is outright authoritarian. He seeks to impose his own
admittedly minority view on the rest of the country by the fiat of a small
group of judges and intellectuals, backed up by the government's force
and compulsion. I fail to see the moral appeal of such an enterprise.

II. THE LEGAL PRECEDENTS
As a matter of legal precedent, the courts in fact have already soundly
rejected the notion of a constitutional right to minimum government welfare assistance. In Maher v. Roe," the Court upheld a Connecticut regulation that prohibited the use of state Medicaid funds to finance abortions
that were not medically necessary.' While the Court reaffirmed the basic
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 525.
Id. at 529.
432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Id. at 478.
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right to an abortion established in Roe v. Wade,6 the Court held that the
government's failure to pay for such abortions did not violate that right.7
No constitutional violation occurred even though the state's Medicaid
program financed childbirth and, as a result, might influence a poor person's abortion decision. The Court stated:
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind from the laws
invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the pregnant woman's
path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers
no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for
the service she desires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has
imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.
The indigency that may make it difficult and in some cases, perhaps,
impossible for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in
any way affected by the Connecticut regulation. We conclude that the
Connecticut regulation does not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.
The Court also said, "[tihe Constitution imposes no obligation on the
States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women,
or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents."
Similarly, in Harris v. McRae,'0 the Court upheld the federal Hyde
Amendment, which prohibited the use of Medicaid funds for abortions
except in limited circumstances." The Court reasoned that
it simply [did] not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with
it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself
of the full range of protected choices. The reason why was explained in
Maher: [A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not
of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category. The financial
constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full
range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not
of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency ....

Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords pro*tection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
432 U.S. at 480.
Id. at 474. '
Id. at 469. See also id. at 475-77.
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
Id. at 316.
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choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom. To hold otherwise would mark a drastic change in
our understanding of the Constitution. It cannot be that because government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives . . . or prevent parents
from sending their children to a private school. . ., government, there-

fore, has an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons have the financial resources to obtain contraceptives or send their
children to private schools. To translate the limitation on governmental
power implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to subsidize the medically necessary
abortion of an indigent woman even if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically necessary services. Nothing in
the Due Process Clause supports such an extraordinary result. Whether
freedom of choice that is constitutionally protected warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer, not a matter of constitu12
tional entitlement.
In Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,13
the Court held that local government officials did not violate the Constitution by failing to protect a'child against abuse by his father resulting in
permanent brain damage, even though the officials had ample warning of
the danger.1 ' The Court said,
nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on' the
State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of
safety and security. It forbids the state itself to deprive individuals of
life, liberty, or property without "due process of law," but its language
cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the
State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other
means. Nor does history support such an expansive reading of the constitutional text. Like its counterpart in the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent government "from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression.

. .

."

Its purpose was to protect people from the State, not

to ensure that the State protected them from each
Consistent with these principles, our cases have
Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative
aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure

12. Id. at 316-18.
13. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
14. Id. at 199.

other . ...
recognized that the
right to government
life, liberty, or prop-
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erty interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual .
The Supreme Court, therefore, has consistently rejected any general
constitutional right to government assistance, even before any Reagan ap-

pointees darkened the Court's doors. Under the above cases, the government will violate a constitutional right only when it affirmatively inter-

feres in an individual's constitutionally protected activities. When it
simply fails to subsidize activities, it has not interfered but simply has
left the individual in his original position. It, therefore, cannot have vio-

lated the Constitution. Based on this distinction, the above cases repeatedly hold that the government has no constitutional obligation to provide
assistance, even when that assistance is practically necessary for the individual to engage in a constitutionally protected activity. Moreover, the
Court has upheld this distinction specifically in cases concerning assistance for health care, education, housing, welfare, and disability benefits.
Clearly, this substantial body of legal precedent precludes Professor
Chemerinsky's proposed right to minimum welfare entitlements.

III. SOCIAL POLICY
Professor Chemerinsky bemoans supposed waves of dramatic cuts in
welfare assistance. But government spending on low-income assistance
programs is at an all time high by every measure. Total federal, state, and
15. Id. at 195-96. See also Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991) (Court upheld
regulations prohibiting federal funding of abortion counseling, saying, "[t]he Government
has no constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because the activity is constitutionally protected ... ."); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
(Court upheld state prohibition on use of public employees or facilities to perform abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (same); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973)
(Constitutional right to attend private schools does not mean state must provide assistance
to private as well as public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (While state
may not prohibit teaching of a foreign language within its borders, it may exclude foreign
language teaching from its public curriculum and all public aid); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No constitutional right to education); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (In finding no constitutional right to housing, the Court
said, "[w]e do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill."); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (In finding no constitutional right to welfare,
the Court said, "the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented
by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court."); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (Disabled have no
constitutional right to public assistance); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515
(1959) (In holding that the constitutional right to lobby public officials did not require a
subsidy for such activities through tax exemptions or deductions, the Court rejected the
"notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State."); Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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local spending on means-tested programs for low-income persons totaled
more than $280 billion in fiscal 1992, an all-time record.16 This is up from
$106 billion in 1980, an increase of 164%, and $9.6 billion in 1965.17 In
constant dollars, total government spending on these programs grew 56%
from 1980 to 1992, and about 7 times from 1965 to 1992.16 These programs totalled 4.77% of GDP in fiscal 1992, another all-time record, up
from 4.01% in fiscal 1980, and 1.44% in fiscal 1965.19 This level of government welfare spending is already an excessive, unfair burden on working
people.
Nevertheless, Professor Chemerinsky complains that the Great Society
programs were somehow starved for funds, with a cryptic reference to
some expenditure of $1.6 billion at some unspecified point.20 But over
$3.5 trillion has been spent on low-income programs since 1965.2' This is
more than the inflation adjusted cost of World War II, or the current
8
value of all Fortune 500 firms.2 This was not enough?
Professor Chemerinsky states that, "[a]fter dramatic improvements in
lessening poverty during the 1960s, the percentage who are impoverished
increased during the 1980s."2" But this is a misleading picture of poverty
trends. Poverty dropped sharply after World War II, falling from 32% in
1950 to 14.7% in 1966, when the War on Poverty was just beginning.2 5
But by 1970, soon after the War on Poverty programs were implemented,
the poverty rate stopped declining.26 By 1979, the poverty rate was actu16. BURKE VEE, CASH AND NON-CASH BENEFITS FOR PERSONS WITH LIMITED INCOME: ELIGIBILITY RULES, RECIPIENT AND EXPENDITURE DATA, FY 1988-90 (1991); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FY 92 tbl. 11.3 (1992); Committee on Ways and
Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Overview of Entitlement Programs 614, 1415-16
(1991) ("1991 Green Book").
17. VEE, supra note 16.

18. Id.
19. Id. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 16, at 1415.
20.' Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 530.
21. Robert Rector, The Paradox of Poverty: How We Spent 3.5 Trillion Without Changing the Poverty Rate, Heritage Lecture 410 at Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.
(Sept. 29, 1992).
22. Id.
23.

Further insisting that current welfare benefit levels are "minimal" and "grossly inad-

equate," Professor Chemerinsky states that in California in 1990, "A family of four on
AFDC [Aid for Families with Dependent Children] received $788 per month. It is impossible to imagine surviving, paying for the essentials, on that amount." Chemerinsky, supra
note 1, at 532. But a family of four on AFDC in California in 1990 was also eligible for food
stamps, medicaid, the school lunch program, housing assistance, and other programs
amounting to about $15,000 for the year in total benefits.
24. Id. at 527.
25. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSING AND HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STATISTICS DIVISION,
POVERTY AND WEALTH STATISTIC BRANCH

26. Id.

16, table 2 (1991).
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ally increasing, growing 30% from 1978 to 1982, when it reached 15.2%.27
But starting in 1983, soon after the Reagan economic and social policy
reforms were implemented, the poverty rate declined each and every year
for the rest of the 1980s.28
Professor Chemerinsky takes great pains to argue that the poor have
nothing to do with causing their poverty, which he contends befalls them
as a result of "social realities" and "social factors." ' But persistent, longterm poverty in the United States today is almost entirely the result of
behavioral patterns of the poor themselves and has little to do with general economic conditions. The primary factors causing long-term poverty
today are teenage illegitimacy, noncompletion of high school, drug and
alcohol abuse, and failure to accept available work. Single parent families,
generally resulting from illegitimacy, alone account for over half of all
poor families.8 0 Chemerinsky argues that, "[a]t the most basic level, there
are not a sufficient number of jobs paying wages above the poverty level
for all who need them."8 ' But this is fallacious. Poverty in the United
States is negligible among those who finish high school, marry, and work
regularly at available jobs. As Charles Murray states, boldly but correctly:
The requirements for getting out of poverty in this country are so minimal that it takes a mutually reinforcing cluster of behaviors to remain in
poverty, even if you are black and even if you are female. If you follow a
set of modest requirements, you are almost surely going to avoid poverty.
These requirements for a male, black or white, are to go to a free public
school and complete high school. Get into the labor market and get a job,
any job, and stick with the labor market. 2

27. Id.

28. Id.
29. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 529.
30. BUREAU OF CENSUS, SER. P-60. No. 175,

POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

20, tbl. 4

(1991).

31. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 529.
32. Charles Murray & Deborah Laren, According to Age: Longitudinal Profiles of AFDC
Recipients and the Poor by Age Group, Working Seminar on the Family and American
Welfare Policy 89 (Sept. 23, 1986) (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.). Similarly, a collection of welfare policy scholars and experts gathering regularly at the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., published the following conclusion, among others:
THE NEW CONSENSUS ON FAMILY AND WELFARE: "The possibilities of remaining involuntarily
in poverty are remarkably low for those who complete high school; once an adult, get married and stay married (even if not on the first try); stay employed, even if at a wage and
under conditions below their ultimate aims." AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, THE NEW
CONSENSUS ON WELFARE: A COMMUNITY OF SELF-RELIANCE 5 (1986) (Working Seminar on the
Family and American Welfare Policy).
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Finally, Professor Chemerinsky cannot understand why people think
the War on Poverty has failed."8 But after the expenditure of $3.5 trillion,
and record current levels of spending, the poverty rate today at 14.2% is
about the same as when the War on Poverty started. Moreover, the social
condition of the poor is actually worse in many key areas. After adoption
of these programs, illegitimacy among the poor soared, marriage rates declined, and divorce increased, leaving many single parent households. Labor force participation among the poor declined, while violent crime increased. Long term welfare dependency set in for millions of families.
Based on recent experience, well over half of the 3.8 million families currently receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") will
remain dependent for over 10 years, and many will remain so for 15 years
or more.3 4 This dependency is now also often passed on from generation
to generation with children raised in welfare families three times more
likely to be on welfare as adults.8 5
Despite urban renewal and public housing efforts, many poor neighborhoods have deteriorated further and further. Moreover, the rising portion
of single parent households among the poor has produced many other
problems. Children from such homes fall behind in educational achievement, perform less well on standardized tests, and even test with lower
IQs. They are two to three times more likely to experience mental illness
or other psychological disorders, and are more likely to commit teen suicides. They use drugs more heavily and commit more violent crimes
throughout their lives. Moreover, they pass these problems on to their
own children. Girls raised in single parent homes are 2.5 times as likely to
bear illegitimate children, twice as likely to suffer divorce, and three
times as likely to become welfare recipients, as girls raised in two parent
homes. 36
Most damning of all, both analysis and experience show that the government's poverty programs themselves have been counterproductively
involved in causing these worsening trends, strongly contributing to persistent poverty. Two effects are key. First, government welfare programs
provide strong disincentives to work, since the benefits are paid primarily
to those who do not work, or at least do not work fully. Abundant evidence exists to show that soaring government welfare assistance has substantially reduced work effort among the poor. The proportion of poor
households headed by full-time working adults has declined from about
33. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 530.
34. Robert Rector, A Conservative's Guide to State Level Welfare Reform, in MAKING
GOVERNMENT WORK: A CONSERVATIVE AGENDA FOR THE STATES (Tex Lazar ed., 1992).
35. Id.
36. Nicholas Davidson, Life Without Father, POLICY REVIEW 40 (Winter 1990).
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one-third in the 1950s to 16.4% today."' Labor force participation among
young black males has declined from 74.1% in 1960 to 59.1% in 1990. 38
About 30% of black males ages 16-24 not in school are currently not participating in the work force.39 The comprehensive and well-known
"SIME/DIME" experiments of the 1970s concluded that every dollar of
extra welfare given to low-income persons reduced labor earnings by
eighty cents. 0
The second key effect is that government welfare programs seem to
cause illegitimacy, nonmarriage, and single parent households. In large
measure, this is because government benefits are primarily paid to single
parent families with children. Consequently, young couples can do better
if they remaip unmarried with the mother and children receiving full welfare and the father receiving his income without any welfare offset, or
otherwise free to pursue his interests. But another factor seems to be at
work as well. With the government providing large scale and widespread
subsidies for single parent families, social attitudes in communities eligible for those subsidies seem to change. The males no longer see themselves as necessary to providing support for their families, and become
more willing to leave this role to the government, freeing themselves of
family support responsibilities. For the women, the government may seem
more reliable for support than an unskilled young male anxious to be free
of the responsibility, who may also be only intermittently involved in the
work force. As more and more families in the community opt for nonmarriage and single parenthood, these alternatives become socially acceptable, and even expected.
Seeming to confirm this analysis, illegitimacy in the black community
has soared from 26% in 1965 to an incredible 64.5% in 1989, meaning
almost two-thirds of all black babies born today have an unwed mother.4 1
The same effect is occurring in the low-income white community, with
the total white illegitimacy rate soaring from 4% in 1965 to 19% in
1989.42 Strikingly similar effects can be found in other countries. These
impacts of welfare in causing nonwork, illegitimacy, and nonmarriage in
turn contribute to other worsening trends noted above, such as crime, de-

37.
38.
39.
40.

Rector, supra note 34.
Charles Murray, The Legacy of the 60s, COMMENTARY, July 1992, at 23, 28.
Id.
Rector, supra note 34.

41.

NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VOL.

REPORT

(1991);

OF FINAL NATALITY STATISTICS

42.
REPORT

VITAL STATISTICS

(1989).

NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VOL.

(1991);

40, No. 8, MONTHLY

NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, SUPPLEMENTAL, ADVANCE REPORT

40,

No. 8, MONTHLY

VITAL STATISTICS

NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, SUPPLEMENTAL, ADVANCE REPORT
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teriorating neighborhoods, long term dependency, and problems for children of single parent families.
Professor Chemerinsky seems oblivious to all this, marching on to demand still more, massive increases in welfare assistance. But by ignoring
these well-documented, large-scale, and tragic failures and problems of
the current welfare system, Professor Chemerinsky has simply failed to
come to grips with the real issue.
IV.

RIGHTS AND WRONGS

Professor Chemerinsky states: "The idea of a constitutional right to
livelihood runs against deeply embedded social attitudes."' 8 But the
problem is much deeper than that. The idea runs against fundamental
principles of liberal (in the classical sense) political philosophy.
The rights enshrined in the Constitution all serve to protect the freedom of action of all individuals, and they do so equally for all. Under the
freedom of speech clause, the freedom of all individuals to speak is protected, and is protected equally. Under the freedom of religion clause, the
freedom of all individuals to follow their own religious views is protected,
and is protected equally. These rights consequently unambiguously expand the freedom of all individuals in society. Such rights, therefore, are
considered fundamental human rights in classical liberal political philosophy and should be constitutionally protected from the vicissitudes of varying political majorities.
But the right to minimum welfare entitlements advanced by Professor
Chemerinsky is of an entirely different character. This right would grant
to some individuals the right to consume the economic output produced
by other individuals, after having that output seized from those individuals by the government through the use of force and coercion. This right
clearly does not unambiguously expand the freedom of all individuals in
society. It grants benefits to some individuals at the expense of the freedom of other individuals to enjoy the fruits of their own labor. And instead of equality of all, some individuals are favored with benefits and
other individuals are disfavored by the forced loss of their own economic
output to fund the benefits of others."
43. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 525.
44. Professor Chemerinsky argues that the Constitution includes several affirmative duties analogous to his proposed right to minimum welfare entitlements. Chemerinsky, supra
note 1, at 533-36. But the referenced Takings Clause again protects the freedom of all individuals, equally, to retain and control their property without forced, uncompensated seizure
by the government, just as the other, traditional constitutional rights discussed above. The
other rights referenced mostly involve procedural restraints on government that protect the
freedom of action of all individuals, equally, from government interference, again just as the
traditional constitutional rights discussed above. None of these rights grant some individu-
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As a matter of moral analysis, some individuals should not have the
right to consume the economic output of others when that output has
been seized from others by force, without even any political say by those
who are forcibly required to suffer the loss. Such a situation would reduce
the forced payers to the moral status of economic slaves. At a minimum,
therefore, such issues should be left to resolution by the political, democratic process, rather than removed from that process by a right to mini45
mum welfare entitlements as advocated by Professor Chemerinsky.

als the right to reduce the freedom of others, by forcibly seizing and consuming their economic output or property, or otherwise, as Professor Chemerinsky's proposed right to welfare entitlements would. Neither do the remaining provisions referenced, which simply state
how the government will operate (e.g. keep a journal, conduct a census) and do not involve
rights of individuals of any sort.
Professor Chemerinsky argues that when the government does not act, it is responsible for
what it does not prevent just as if it directly acted to cause that result. Id. at 533. He also
argues that his proposed constitutional right to welfare entitlements can be phrased as a
negative prohibition on what the government may do-that being inaction in the face of
strong need. Id. at 534-36. But, in addition to being illogical, neither of these propositions
change the fact, as discussed above, that Professor Chemerinsky's proposed right to minimum welfare entitlements does not protect the freedom of action of all individuals, equally,
as with other constitutional rights, but rather grants benefits to some individuals at the
expense of the freedom of other individuals.
45. Indeed, one may ask what is the moral justification for allowing some individuals to
use force and coercion to seize and consume the economic output of others, even through
the political, democratic process? Nozick argues that there is no moral justification for such
actions, contending that government force and coercion is morally limited only to preventing some individuals from using force and coercion against others. See ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 26-53 (1974). Epstein argues that the Takings Clause already constitutionally prohibits, and properly so, the forced seizure of the output of some for the
consumption of others. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985). Under his analysis, the Constitution properly only allows taxation in return for direct benefits to all of those taxed, such
as through national defense or generally available infrastructure. Under these views, rather
than a constitutional right to minimum welfare entitlements, the Constitution should prohibit such redistributive welfare entitlements, and grant all citizens the right to be free from
the forced seizure of their economic output for the consumption of others.

